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DISTINCTIVE TAX TREATMENT OF INCOME
FROM OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION
STEPHEN L. McDONALDt
I
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The provisions of federal tax law that result in distinctive treatment of income from oil and gas production do not pertain to nominal rates of taxation but to the amounts and timing of capital consumption allowances in the computation of taxable income.' These
provisions fall into two general categories: (1) the option to
use either a percentage of gross income or a pro rata share of certain capitalized costs as a measure of depletion, and (2) the option
to currently expense certain capital outlays or to capitalize them for
gradual recovery through the depletion allowance. As the follow-

ing brief history indicates, 2 the first option evolved through legislative channels, the second through administrative channels.
The Revenue Act of 1913, the first act levying an income tax
following final ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution, authorized "a reasonable allowance" for capital consumption in the computation of taxable income. In the case of mines (including oil and gas wells), the act specified a maximum permissible
depletion deduction of five percent of the gross value at the mine of
output during the tax period. Three years later, the Revenue Act of
1916 made no distinction in principle between mining and other
types of enterprises in the rules governing capital consumption allowances. However, it did contain a provision that proved of particular value to the mineral industries. It provided for depreciation
or depletion based on historical costs or, in the case of capital assets
held prior to March 1, 1913, the fair market value as of that date.
The latter option, apparently intended to place taxpayers who had
acquired assets at different times under different cost conditions on
a similar tax basis, was especially beneficial to those mineral prot Professor, Department of Economics, University of Texas, Austin.

1. The statement applies equally to the tax treatment of incomes from other commercial minerals. The special provisions in respect to them differ only in degree and
detail from those in respect to oil and gas. See Joint Econ. Comm., 87th Cong., 1st Sess.,
The Federal Revenue System: Facts and Problems 89-93 (1961), for a summary of
current provisions regarding income from natural resources.
2. The following account is based on Legislative History of Depletion Allowances,
Joint Comm. on Internal Revenue and Taxation, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1950) ; Blaise,
What Every Tax Man Should Know .About PercentageDepletion, 36 Taxes 417 (1958) ;
and Lentz, Mineral Economics and the Problem of Equitable Taxation, 55 Q. Colo.
School of Mines 10 (1960).
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ducers who, due to the unpredictable fortunes of exploration, had
discovered prior to March 1, 1913, deposits of substantially greater
value than their discovery cost.
In 1918 Congress took explicit cognizance of the fact that the
cost of discovery need bear no close relationship to the initial value
of a mineral deposit. The Revenue Act of 1918 provided generally
for depreciation or depletion based on cost or property value as of
March 1, 1913. However, in the case of non-purchased mines and
oil and gas wells discovered after March 1, 1913, where the fair
market value upon discovery was "materially disproportionate" to
the cost, the option was provided to base depletion allowances on
discovery value. With the stated purpose of encouraging exploration
for new mineral deposits, Congress thus held out to the discoverertaxpayer the higher of two possible depletion bases: cost or discovery value. The possible benefit of the latter, however, was restricted by later legislation. In the Revenue Act of 1921 discoveryvalue depletion was limited to 100 percent of a property's net income computed without allowance for depletion. The purpose of this
was to preclude taxpayers from charging off tax losses from mineral
operations against taxable income from other sources. The Revenue
Act of 1924 tightened the limitation to .50 percent of a property's
net income before depletion.
Due to the relatively large number of separate oil and gas discoveries and the great difficulty in determining a fair market value
of minerals shortly after discovery, the administration of discoveryvalue depletion for oil and gas properties proved exceedingly complex. Apparently to eliminate this difficulty and at the same time
to retain discovery-value depletion in principle, Congress in 1926
substituted a rule-of-thumb measure for oil and gas depletion deductions. These deductions were based on what was taken to be the
typical relation of discovery-value deductions to gross income in
the years preceding. The figure adopted was 272 percent of gross
income. With the substitution of percentage depletion for discoveryvalue depletion in the case of oil and gas production,3 the 50-percent-of-net limitation was retained. Also retained was the alternative
of using depletion based on actual cost should it provide a larger
deduction than percentage depletion. But unlike discovery-value
depletion, which had been confined to discovered properties of the
taxpayer, percentage depletion was made applicable to all properties
however acquired. The 1926 enactments have remained intact to the
present.
3. The substitution was made for metals, sulphur and coal in 1932. Other minerals

were added to the list in subsequent years, the last in 1954.
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The legislation authorizing discovery-value and percentage depletion was supplemented, and its value to taxpayers enhanced, by
several important administrative rulings.' In 1917 Treasury Decision 2447 provided that the "incidental expenses of drilling wells"
and expenses that "do not necessarily enter into and form a part
of the capital invested or property account," might, at the option
of the taxpayer, be deducted from gross income as ordinary operating expenses. Internal Revenue Regulation 33, Revised, was
issued in January 1918 and used similar language. It provided that
costs charged to the capital account under the option and "represented by physical property" might be recovered through depreciation (as distinguished from depletion). The same regulation also
provided that the cost of drilling unproductive wells could be treated
as ordinary operating expense. Subsequent regulations and decisions
with issue dates running into the 1950's, retained the provision regarding dry hole costs. They also, in the case of productive wells,
gradually extended the term "incidental expense of drilling" to embrace all expenditures of an "intangible" nature. Today, the expenses of drilling and equipping productive wells that may be
charged off as incurred include costs of labor, fuel, power, materials,
supplies, tool rental and repairs of drilling equipment. These typically account for two-thirds or more of the total expense of drilling
and equipping productive wells.
The effect of the administrative rulings was twofold. First, they
provided for the deduction, through either depreciation or current
expense, of all outlays in drilling and equipping wells in addition to
the depletion allowance. Second, they provided for the current expensing (as opposed to amortization over time) of all unsuccessful
exploration expenses, plus the greater part of the expenses of drilling and equipping productive wells. The depletion allowance thus
became a supplement to, rather than a substitute for, cost-based
capital consumption deductions. In addition, most actual capital
outlays became subject to super-accelerated amortization.
With this historical background, we may now examine in greater
detail the special tax provisions applying to income from oil and
gas production.
II

DISTINCTIVE TAX TREATMENT AT PRESENT

The deduction for oil and gas depletion in a tax period must
presently be computed for each separate productive property or
4. For a more detailed discussion of these rulings see Galvin, The "Ought" and "Is"
of Oil-and-Gas Taxation, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1465-69 (1960).
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operating unit. The deduction is the larger of ( 1 ) a pro rata (unitof-production) fraction ' of the capitalized costs of the property exclusive of depreciable outlays or (2) 27 I2 percent of the gross value
of the production, not to exceed 50 percent of the net income, of the
property during the tax period. The former alternative, known as
cost depletion, does not differ in principle from the usual treatment
of capital consumption in other industries. The total to be recovered
through tax deductions is the initial capitalized cost, and recovery
is made in a reasonable, systematic way over the life of the property.
The relevant capitalized costs depend on the manner in which
the producing property was acquired. If it was purchased, the full
purchase price would be capitalized and the portion not attributable
to depreciable assets would be the basis of cost depletion. If the
property was acquired through discovery, the capitalized costs would
normally be confined to lease acquisition and exploration costs other
than dry hole costs, attributable to the property. This is assuming
that in the normal case, for reasons to be explained, the affected
operator would choose to expense dry hole and intangible development costs.
The alternative method of computing allowable depletion is percentage depletion. Under this alternative, the total tax deductions
that result are not limited to the initial capitalized cost of the depletable asset and ordinarily exceed the initial capitalized cost. The
cost depletion and percentage depletion alternatives are available
to those having direct ownership shares in the mineral being produced. These include operating interests, royalties, and other shares
of production. Also, there is no distinction between foreign and
domestic location of production.
For operators of oil and gas properties, who are usually lessees,
the gross income on which percentage depletion is based is exclusive
of royalties paid. This is so because the royalty owner is entitled to
depletion on his share of production. The operator's net income, pertinent to the 50-percent-of-net limitation on percentage depletion, is
computed a's the difference between gross income after royalties and
all costs except depletion attributable to property in the tax period.
Such costs include: production expenses (inclusive of production
taxes and an apportionment of overhead), ad valorem taxes, allocable interest, depreciation of tangible investments in wells and
equipment, the cost of dry holes, and the intangible expenses of
drilling productive wells unless such expenses are capitalized. Costs
5. A fraction equal to the ratio of the tax period's production to estimated total
production over the lifetime of the affected property.
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not attributable to producing properties do not act as potential
limitations on allowable percentage depletion but are otherwise
fully deductible for tax purposes. Such costs not attributable to producing properties include: the costs of surrendered leases, dry holes
and other unsuccessful exploration activity on nonproducing properties, interest, taxes, and overhead allocable to such properties.
Due to the 50-percent-of-net limitation and the requirement of
computing allowable percentage depletion separately for each individual property, the effective percentage depletion rate for the
typical producing firm is less than 27Y2 percent. For large firms
the average effective rate is about 26 percent. 6 For all producing
firms the average is probably lower, perhaps closer to 25 percent.
Moreover, the percentage depletion allowance is not all net benefit
because in using this option the taxpayer forfeits the right to separate deductions for capitalized costs subject to depletion. These
capitalized costs subject to depletion include at least the lease
acquisition and exploration costs (other than dry hole costs) attributable to productive properties. These forfeited deductions
typically amount to about two percent of gross income. 7 So the
average effective net percentage depletion benefit is in the neighborhood of 23 percent of gross income.
The other type of distinctive tax provision applying to income
from oil and gas production pertains directly to the timing of deductions reflecting two major categories of expense. Also affected
indirectly is the total amount of allowable capital consumption deductions. The oil and gas producer has the option of either capitalizing intangible development costs and recovering them through
depletion or writing them off as a current expense. If he elects to
capitalize intangible development costs, the producer has the futher
option of capitalizing dry hole costs and recovering them through
depletion or expensing them as incurred.
There are two advantages to expensing these costs, provided the
taxpayer has otherwise sufficient taxable income to cover them.
First, their current expensing yields an imputed interest saving in
comparison with capitalization and recovery over an extended
period of time. For example, assume a $100 outlay that for tax
purposes may be either expensed immediately or amortized by the
straight-line method over a period of ten years. Given a nominal
income tax rate of 50 percent, immediate expensing results in a tax
6. This figure is based on a Treasury sample of large corporations accounting for
over 90 percent of total oil and gas depletion claimed in the years 1958-60. U.S.
Treasury Dep't, Depletion Survey, 1958-60 (mimeo. 1963).
7. For the derivation of this figure, see S. McDonald, Federal Tax Treatment of
Income from Oil and Gas 17n. (1963).
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deduction having a present worth of $50. With a discount rate of
ten percent, amortization over ten years results in tax deductions
having a present worth of approximately $34. Expensing thus saves
the taxpayer the current equivalent of $16.' Secondly, the expensing
of intangible development and dry hole costs enhances the value
of percentage depletion. If capitalized, these costs are recoverable
only through depletion; but if expensed, they are recoverable in
addition to depletion. Hence the net benefit of percentage depletion
-the allowable depletion in excess of alternative cost-based depletion-is enlarged by the election to expense intangible development
and dry hole costs.9
The benefit of expensing major capital outlays in combination
with percentage depletion may be clarified by means of an illustration. Assume a lessee corporation operating two productive properties as in Part A of Table 1.L' Further assume that the firm
chooses to expense intangible development and dry hole costs. All
intangible development costs and such dry hole costs as are attributable to productive properties enter into the expenses. These expenses
must be deducted from gross income after royalties to determine the
net income to which the 50 percent limitation of allowable depletion applies. Here it is assumed that such expenses are high enough
to make the 50-percent-of-net limitation effective on property B,
but not on property A. Thus, although the two properties have the
same gross income after royalties, property B is allowed a depletion
deduction of only $100,000 while property A is allowed $137,500,
the full 27Y percent of gross income. Together, the two properties
are allowed a depletion deduction, in addition to deductible costs
attributable to them, of $237,500, or 23.75 percent of gross income.
In Part B of Table I the computation of federal income tax is
completed. After deductions from gross income for costs attributable to individual properties and allowable depletion, the remainder is further reduced by deductions for all other costs of doing
business. These other costs include the costs of dry holes drilled on
unproductive properties. These costs are assumed to be $162,500,
leaving a taxable income of $100,000. The federal income tax
liability, assumed for convenience to be exactly 50 percent of taxable income, is $50,000.
8. The saving would, of course, be larger if the discount rate were higher, or
smaller if some more accelerated plan of amortization were allowed.
9. This statement is subject to one important qualification. Since the expensing of
costs pertaining to productive properties reduces the current net income from such
properties, expensing of intangibles and dry hole costs may reduce allowable percentage depletion through the 50-percent-of-net limitation.
10. This illustration is adapted from McDonald, supra note 7, at 20.
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Table 1
COMPUTATION OF ALLOWABLE PERCENTAGE DEPLETION DEDUCTION
AND FEDERAL INCOME TAX LIABILITY, HYPOTHETICAL CORPORATION

A. Allowable percent depletion deduction
Properties
A
$500,000
-150,000
- 50,000
300,000

B
$500,000
-250,000
- 50,000
200,000

(2732 percent of gross)

(137,500)

(137,500)

(50 percent of net)

(150,000)

Gross income after royalty
Less: Intangible development costs
Other costs attributable to property
Net property income before depletion

Less: allowable depletion
Net property income after depletion

(100,000)

-137,500

-100,000

162,500

100,000

B. Federal income tax liability
Both properties
consolidated

Gross income after royalty
Less: Costs attributable to properties

-

Net property income before depletion

Less: Allowable depletion deduction
Net property income after depletion
Less: All other costs of doing business

500,000

-

Net taxable income

Less: Federal Income tax
Net income after tax per tax return

$1,000,000
500,000
237,500
262,500
162,500
100,000

-

50,000
50,000

In choosing the percentage depletion option, the corporation forfeits the right to take separate deductions representing amortization
of lease acquisition and exploration costs (other than dry hole costs)
attributable to productive properties. If such deductions would
have been $37,500, the net excess of percentage depletion over
alternative cost-basis depletion would be $200,000, so that the
firm's actual net income before taxes is $300,00011 and the effective
tax rate is only 16 2/3 percent.
11. If the firm amortized intangible development costs for its own internal records,
as many firms do, net income as shown by its accounts would further differ from tax
return net income by the excess of current intangible outlays over current amortization
charges. All firms expense dry hole costs for purposes of internal accounts, so no
difference from tax return net income arises due to different treatment of these costs.
For a survey of accounting practices in the petroleum industry see Horace R. Brock,
Accounting for Leasehold, Exploration and Development Costs in the American
Petroleum Industry (unpublished doctoral thesis, The University of Texas, 1954).
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It should be clear from the illustration that the corporation could
have a substantial net income without any current income tax liability at all. For example, if intangible development costs on property A were $25,000 greater and dry hole costs on unproductive
properties were $75,000 greater, allowable depletion would be unaffected, actual income would be $200,000, and taxable income
would be zero. 2 Of course, the reduction of current tax liability due
to the expensing of capital outlays is mere postponement. However,
the postponement may last (and be enlarged) indefinitely if the affected corporation continues to grow rapidly enough. Furthermore,
the firm may sell one or more of its properties for capital gains
before ordinary income tax liability catches up. Thus postponed income is subjected to a maximum tax rate of 25 percent. In any
case, the postponement of tax liability yields an imputed interest
saving, as explained above.
To sum up, the distinctive tax provisions applying to income
from oil and gas production usually allow the affected taxpayer
to make deductions from gross income that in total exceed actual
costs incurred. They also allow the taxpayer to treat some major categories of cost as current operating expenses even though they are incurred to acquire assets of long productive life. These provisions may
be viewed, then, as devices of reducing the effective rate of taxation
of income from oil and gas production relative to that applying
to ordinary income earned in other pursuits. The package is especially valuable to rapidly growing firms that each year have a large
volume of drilling, exploration and development, nearly all of the
expenses of which may be charged off against current income.
III
THE ISSUE OF TAX NEUTRALITY

The immediately foregoing observations lead directly to the
standard economic criticism of percentage depletion and expensing
privileges. The criticism is that they are not neutral with respect to
the allocation of economic resources among different industries. On
the premise that in the absence of income taxation resources would
be optimally allocated among industries, it is argued that ideally
income taxes should be levied in such a way as to induce no changes
in the allocation of resources. It is asserted that distinctive tax
treatment of income from oil, gas, or other commercial minerals
violates that ideal. It violates the ideal by reducing the relative
12.

In fact, some oil and gas producers have managed to escape income taxation

in some years. For a number of examples see 103 Cong. Rec. 3978 (1957).
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effective income tax rate in the mineral industry. This treatment attracts to the industry some labor and capital that would have produced a greater product in an alternative location. The result is a
lower real income for society at large.
A leading statement of the unneutrality thesis with respect to
percentage depletion and expensing privileges is that of Arnold C.
Harberger. 13 Presented in terms of a simple model, the thesis
refers explicitly to corporate income tax, although the conclusions
would apply, with suitable allowance for rate progressivity, to personal income tax as well. The model abstracts from differences in
risk among industries, so that investors discount expected incomes
at uniform rates. The model assumes that the income tax, corporate
or personal, is not shifted in any degree. Following Harberger, let
us imagine two kinds of real assets, corresponding to two different
industries, one a machine and the other a mineral deposit. Assume
that at the margin these two assets are economic equivalents in
the sense that the streams of income expected from them, net of
other costs but before provision for depreciation or depletion, are
identical. It is readily apparent that these two assets would be
equally attractive to investors if (a) there were no income tax or
if (b) the two income streams were subject to identical effective
rates of taxation. This is another way of saying that equal investments in these assets would yield equal rates of return under either
of the two conditions. Therefore, with identical effective rates of
taxation, the allocation of capital between the two kinds of assets
(two different industries) would be the same as if there were no
tax at all. If the allocation of capital were optimal in the absence of
a tax, it would be optimal with an equally effective tax. It is also
apparent that if income from the mineral deposit were subjected
to a lower effective tax than income from the machine because of
total tax deductions in excess of costs and accelerated amortization
of certain costs, its present worth would be greater than that of the
machine following imposition of a nominally uniform tax. Capital
would flow from investments in machines to investments in minerals
until relative price and cost adjustments once again made the present worth of each equal. In the new equilibrium there would be a
larger amount of capital invested in minerals and a smaller amount
in machines. If the allocation of capital were optimal in the absence
of a tax, it would not be optimal with unequal effective rates of
tax. Since optimality of resource allocation implies maximum ag13. Harberger, The Taxation of Mineral Industries, Federal Tax Policy for Economic Growth and Stability, Joint Comm. on the Econ. Rep., 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 439
(1955).
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gregate real income, differential taxation imposes a cost upon society
as a whole in the form of reduced real income.
This conclusion with respect to corporate income tax must be
qualified in the light of at least two considerations.14 First, the tax
does not apply to all returns to capital in all uses or industries. It does
not apply to rent and interest incomes earned through the medium of
corporations. Nor does it fall directly upon the net incomes of unincorporated businesses. Therefore, even with equal effective rates, the
tax is basically unneutral with respect to the allocation of capital
among industries. Second, the assumption that resources would be
optimally allocated in the absence of the subject tax abstracts from
other existing forms of taxes that significantly affect, often with
deliberate design, the allocation of resources among industries.
Severence, excise and selective sales taxes, to which oil and gas products are widely subjected, are obvious cases in point. Given the resulting unneutralities, it is not necessarily true that the supposed
reallocative effects of distinctive tax treatment of oil and gas income
lead to a lower real income for society.
But there is a more fundamental objection to the unneutrality
thesis with reference to corporate income tax. The thesis assumes
that the tax is not shifted in any degree. If it is shifted in some degree,'" then even with equally effective rates in all industries, the
tax itself has reallocative effects. It discriminates against relatively
risky and capital intense industries. There is some evidence that the
oil and gas industry, in its finding-developing-producing phase, is
both relatively risky and relatively capital intense. It follows that
the distinctive tax treatment of income from that industry may
simply reduce or eliminate the adverse allocative effects of corporate
income tax. 16
14. Harberger recognizes both reasons to qualify. See his The Corporation Income
Tax: An Empirical Appraisal, Tax Rev. Compendium, Vol. I, House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 231 (1959).
15. For recent major contributions to the debate over the incidence of the corporation income tax see M. Krzyzaniak & R. Musgrave, The Shifting of the Corporation
Income Tax (1963) ; Gordon, The Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax in U.S.
Manufacturing, 57 Am. Econ. Rev. 731 (1967); Cragg, Harberger & Mieszkowski,
Empirical Evidence on the Incidence of the Corporation Income Tax, 75 J. Pol. Econ.
811 (1968).
16. This argument is developed in McDonald, Percentage Depletion and the Allocation of Resources: The Case of Oil and Gas, 14 Nat'l Tax J. 323 (1961). For
critical comments on the argument see Eldridge, Rate of Return, Resource Allocation
and Percentage Depletion, 15 Nat'l Tax J. 209 (1962) ; Musgrave, Another Look at
Depletion, 15 Nat'l. Tax J. 205 (1962) ; Steiner, The Non-Neutrality of Corporate Income Taxation-With and Without Depletion, 16 Nat'l Tax J. 238 (1963). Replies are
given in McDonald, Percentage Depletion and Tax Neutrality: A Reply to Messrs.
Musgrave and Eldridge, 15 Nat'l Tax J. 314 (1962) ; and On the Non-Neutrality of
Corporate Income Taxation: A Reply to Steiner, 17 Nat'l Tax J. 101 (1964).
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The argument is as follows.1 7 Suppose that a flat-rate corporate
income tax is newly imposed. Also assume that the tax is fully
shifted forward in the sense that in all industries, prices per unit of
output are raised sufficiently to restore after-tax rates of return to
pretax levels. To demonstrate the effect on relative prices, all money
values are expressed as amounts per unit of product and n is defined
as the ratio of return on capital (N) to sales price (P) in the initial
situation of no tax. Then: ( 1 ) n = rk, where r is the rate of return
on capital (N/K) in the initial situation and k is the capital intensity
(K/P) in the initial situation. Assume that r is the "normal" rate of
return that will be restored by shifting corporate income tax, and
that k is a constant throughout the adjustment process. Let n' be
defined as N'/P, where N' is the return on capital gross of tax after
full adjustment to the tax (T). By definition T = tN', where t is
the effective income tax rate. Full incorporation of the tax into the
sales prices requires that: (2) P' = P + tN', where P' is the sales
price after full adjustment to the tax. The percentage change in
price c on account of the tax is:
P'- P
P

(3)
Since:

n' -

tN'
=tn'

-

P
tn' = n,
n

n,-

1-t
tn
tn'=
1-t
Substituting from equations (1) and (3) in (4), we have:
trk
(5)

c --

1-t

Applying this conclusion to two hypothetical industries-manufacturing and oil and gas production-it can be seen that if the
same effective tax rate is applied to the two they will experience the
same percentage change in price only if (rk)

is equal to (rk) 2. If

(rk)2 is larger than (rk)i, then equal effective rates of taxation will
17. The following is adapted from McDonald, supra note 7, at 53-55.
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mean a rise in the relative price of oil and gas and a reallocation of
resources at the expense of that industry. In this case, neutrality
calls for a lower effective tax rate on oil and gas income. This could
be achieved by allowing the oil and gas industry a special exclusion
from gross income. If d represents this exclusion, expressed as a
percentage of the initial price P, the condition of neutrality is (6)
d = (rk)2 - (rk)i. If the exclusion is expressed as a percentage of
the adjusted price P', then the exclusion so expressed e is equal to
d/ (1 + cl), where c, is the percentage increase in the price of the
product of manufacturing. Accordingly,
(rk) 2 - (rk)i
(7)

e=
1 - ci

In effect, e is a neutralizing percentage depletion rate.
If we could derive representative "normal" values for r and k in
manufacturing and oil and gas production then we could calculate
the neutralizing percentage depletion rate. We could also compare
it with the actual net effective rate of about 23 percent of gross income. i" This writer has attempted to do this elsewhere1 9 using
Internal Revenue Service data for corporations in the industrial
categories "Manufacturing, except Petroleum and Coal Products"
and "Oil and Gas Production." That study took the period 19491956 (except for 1952, for which data are unavailable) as "normal" years. 2 0 The results, based on total capital and total returns
to capital, are:
Manufacturing Oil and Gas Prod.
20.2%
10.3%
Rate of return (r)
1.41
.523
Capital intensity (k)
2 1.9 %
Neutralizing exemption (e)21
The estimated neutralizing percentage depletion rate of 21.9
percent is quite close to the net effective rate of about 23 percent.
However, the rate of return and capital intensity data for "Oil and
Gas Production" have been challenged as heavily reflecting foreign
operations. 2 When predominantly foreign producers are eliminated
18. See text following note 7, supra.
19. McDonald, supra note 16, at 333-36.
20. The sources were: U.S. Internal Revenue Service, Statistics of Income, Pt. 2,
Corporation Income Tax Returns; and Source Book of Statistics of Income (1949-56).
21. Assumes a nominal tax rate of 50 percent.
22. Eldridge, supra note 16, at 215.
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in the "Oil and Gas Production" category, the comparable results
are:
Manufacturing Oil and Gas Prod.
14.5-%
10.3 %
Rate of return (r)
1.43
.523
Capital intensity (k)
14.5%
Neutralizing exemption (e)
Thus, if "normal" domestic rates of return are considered, the
relevant rates for computing a neutralizing percentage depletion
rate, the result is a rate ( 14.5 percent) that is well below the actual
net rate of about 23 percent. On this basis, the current percentage
depletion allowance is more than neutralizing. This is a conclusion
which is strengthened when the additional effect of expensing.capital
outlays is allowed for.
The foregoing argument that distinctive tax treatment of income
from oil and gas may only offset the unneutrality of corporate income tax is subject to a number of criticisms. First, it is widely
doubted that the tax is shifted.2 3 If it is not, the argument fails, and
if it is only partially shifted, the conclusions of the argument must
be modified in degree. Second, there is some doubt that the observed
relatively high rate of return in the extractive phase of the petroleum industry, particularly in foreign operations, is due to differential riskiness. 24 If it is due to imperfect competition, then it reflects
distinctive tax treatment in part so that the argument is circular.
Third, one may attribute the relatively high capital intensity of
petroleum extraction in large part to wasteful overdrilling induced
or permitted by state conservation regulation. 25 An induced inefficiency in the industry can hardly be used to rationalize distinctive
tax treatment. Fourth, it may be argued that percentage depletion
itself contributes to high capital intensity by motivating integrated
producer-buyers to overprice petroleum (so as to increase the
allowance). This attracts entry and creates overcapacity under
market-demand regulation of production.26 If this point has validity, then the foregoing argument that distinctive tax treatment may
be reneutralizing is circular. Finally, it may be pointed out that in
the oil and gas industry the burden of corporate income tax and the
benefits of distinctive tax treatment are at least partially shifted
23. See the works referred to in note 15, supra, and Musgrave, supra note 16, at
206-08.
24. Eldridge, supra note 16, at 214-16.
25. Kahn, The Depletion Allowance in the Context of Cartelization, 54 Am. Econ.
Rev. 286, 301 (1964).
26. Id. at 303-05.
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backward to recipients of rent (lease bonuses and royalties). 27 To
that extent, the relative prices of oil and gas are unaffected by tax
or benefits, and equity rather than neutrality becomes the relevant
issue.
If one assumes that corporate income tax is fully shifted forward,
that the "normal" rate of return should reflect foreign as well as
domestic operations, and that the remainder of the above criticisms
of the "reneutralizing" thesis are without merit, then it is possible
to defend percentage depletion. But it is not possible to defend the
entire benefit package including the expensing of capital outlays,
against the charge that it is unneutral and damaging to national
income. On the other hand, if one assumes that the tax is not
shifted, that only domestic rates of return are indicative of the
"normal," or that one or more of the remaining criticisms of the
"reneutralizing" thesis are valid, then it must be concluded that
percentage depletion is substantially unneutral and presumably damaging to national income. It is not now possible to say conclusively
which set of assumptions is correct, although the majority professional view would probably favor the latter. If neutrality is to be
the defense of percentage depletion and related tax benefits, the
most convincing case is probably to be built on the effects of these
special provisions within the tax system as a whole. This would include property, severance and sales taxes which bear heavily on oil
and gas and their products.
It may be observed that neutrality is not the only criterion of
good taxation. This is true, but neutrality is addressed to the fundamental economic issue of cost-benefit. It is interesting (and ironic,
in view of the unneutrality criticism) that oil and gas industry arguments in support of the distinctive tax provision seem implicitly to
accept as a premise the proposition that they are "special incentives"
and hence are unneutral. Thus, by encouraging the finding and production of oil and gas the provisions allegedly promote national defense, economic growth, conservation and consumer interest by
making possible "an adequate supply of petroleum products at reasonable prices. ' 28 The nature of the neutrality issue calls our atten27. Davidson, Public Policy Problems of the Domestic Crude Oil Industry, 53 Am.
Econ. Rev. 103 (1963).

28. Mid-Continent Oil and Gas Association, Percentage Depletion, Economic Progress, and National Security 83 (1961). This publication provides probably the most
thorough recent statement of the industry arguments for percentage depletion and related provisions. Another well-rounded presentation of the industry's case is in R.
Gonzales, PercentageDepletion for Petroleum Production, Tax Rev. Compendium, Vol.
2, House Comm. on Ways and Means, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 985, 1008 (1959).

JANUARY 1970]

TAX TREATMENT

OF INCOME

tion to the stimulus to oil and gas production and the costs of such
stimuli to other industries and the economy as a whole.
IV
THE APPLICATION OF PERCENTAGE DEPLETION TO LAND-OWNERS'
ROYALTIES AND LEASE BONUSES

The application of percentage depletion to landowners' royalties
and lease bonuses (hereinafter shortened to "royalties") 2 9 raises
issues different from those involved in the case of operators who
actively search for and produce the minerals. Mineral royalties paid
to land owners usually consist almost entirely of Ricardian or pure
economic rent. Except as they compensate for the income of alternative foregone land uses,"0 such payments have a different economic
significance from payments to laborers and capitalists. Presumably,
the latter are necessary to call forth productive services. The pure
rental of mineral royalties, in contrast, is a residual value in excess
of that necessary to induce production. It is a residual which accrues only by virtue of ownership of a nonreproducible good. It is
clear that such incomes could be taxed at rates approaching 100
percent without reducing the supply of goods and services. Relatively heavy taxation of economic rents, implying relatively light
taxation of income to productive services, would increase the net
real returns to productive activity and thus presumably would increase the latter with benefit to all. It is ironic then that our prevailing income tax laws provide for relatively light taxation of landowners' royalties. The probable net cost in national income foregone compounds the apparent inequity of a functionless inequality
of effective tax rates.
The matter may be carried a bit further. The size of the landowner's economic rent is not independent of the benefits to operating interests of percentage depletion and related provisions. Prospective lessees bid against each other in competition for exploration
and production rightt. Given the uncertainties of success in exploration, bids tend to approach the point where anticipated gross in29. Lease bonuses as received may be treated as advance royalties and hence subject to the percentage depletion allowance. If production is never established on the
property for which the bonus was paid, the recipient mut recompute his income tax

liability for the years affected and treat the lease bonus as ordinary income.
30. Where royalties are paid to those who have specifically purchased the right to
receive them, separate from or in addition to the rights to use the land surface, the
receipts may be regarded as return on capital to the purchaser; but the seller is then

the recipient of the economic rent involved, this rent having been capitalized in the
selling price of the mineral rights.
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come after lease bonus, royalty and taxes is just sufficient to compensate labor and capital for the services necessary for production
under prevailing technical and regulatory practices. The lower the
prospective taxes on income from production, the higher the possible
bids to land-owners. In short, at least some of the benefits to
operating interests of percentage depletion and related provisions
are undoubtedly passed back to land-owners. This is done in the
form of higher rents which are subject to percentage depletion and
hence relatively low effective income tax rates. To the extent that
there is such a return to land-owners, the possible gross benefits of
the distinctive tax provisions to consumers of affected mineral products are reduced. The arguments for these provisions in terms of
such benefits are weakened, and the criticisms in terms of inequity
and economic inefficiency are strengthened.
CONCLUSIONS

Percentage depletion and the expensing of certain capital outlays
result in a lower effective income tax rate for oil and gas producers
than that prevailing in most other industries. As to operators engaged in exploration, development and production, there is a central
economic issue: Do these distinctive tax provisions induce an allocation of resources in industry different from that which would prevail
in a no-tax situation thereby making them "unneutral" ? Under
assumptions most favorable to the industry, we conclude that percentage depletion may be reasonably consistent with neutrality.
However, the combined effect of percentage depletion and expensing privileges is probably unneutral, thereby inducing an uneconomical allocation of resources to oil and gas production. Under assumptions less favorable to the industry but more consistent with majority professional opinion, we conclude that the distinctive tax provisions are markedly unneutral. Consequently, there are important
misallocative effects. The analysis and conclusions, however, abstract from taxes other than income taxes. In the context of the
entire national tax system, it is possible that distinctive tax treatment
of income from oil and gas is more nearly consistent with the ideal
of neutrality.
As applied to bonuses and royalties of land-owners, the effect of
percentage depletion is inequitable and economically perverse. This
conclusion is reinforced by the consideration that operators' tax
benefits are at least partially returned to land-owners in the form of
higher rents. As long as the capital gains alternative is available to
royalty owners, this glaring defect in our income tax system cannot
be removed by simple deletion of the percentage depletion provision.

